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ABSTRACT
Changes in the nature, scale, and speed of natural resource
extraction, especially in the last two decades, have resulted in
many new resource extraction areas emerging across the world.
By zooming in on Indonesia, this article shows that the underlying
causes and consequences of current trends are more complex
than portrayed by the rancher-squatter model of frontiers that is
still frequently used to explain these developments. We argue that
a broadened frontier notion is necessary to address the
multifaceted nature of the processes underway in contemporary
Indonesian extraction areas, as well as beyond. We propose a
perspective that pays explicit attention to four new developments
that can be described by using the hybridization of space, time,
actors, and rules, and are characterized by the fact that these
processes create new perimeters in all four mentioned areas. In so
doing, we challenge, broaden, and renew the meaning of frontiers.
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Introduction
The exploitation of regions rich in natural resources has intensified rapidly in recent
decades. This process is driven by a growing demand for, and investments in, soya,
palm oil, and other bio-industrial cash crops for food or energy, a growing demand for
natural resources, carbon-storage trading initiatives such as the Reduced Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) scheme and other environmentally
driven programs, and portfolio diversification by financial institutions.1 The actors behind
the process are as diverse as the drivers, attracted by the huge potential for fast and vast
profits. Clashing interests, outlooks, and power relationships have given rise to various
types of conflict, at times accompanied by a weakening of central state control.
Contemporary resource areas have much in common with the frontier regions
described in earlier literature. These accounts define frontiers as uninhabited or
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1White and Dasgupta 2010; Deininger et al. 2011; Osborne 2011; Cotula 2012; German et al. 2014.
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underpopulated areas on the fringes of civilization and state control, waiting to be civilized
and put into production.2 Frederick Jackson Turner saw the transformation of these “wild
spaces” into spaces of civilization as unavoidable and desirable, following a linear teleo-
logical pathway toward greater state control, increased law and order, and more insti-
tutions.3 He located these frontiers at the periphery of existing states and labeled them
bare areas waiting to be incorporated into the state by means of settlement.4
In more recent frontier literature, this settler-oriented perspective on frontiers has been
widened to include extraction and control perspectives.5 Frontiers of the extractive type do
not necessarily need the establishment of settler colonies.6 Frontiers of control are usually
state borderlands that are indirectly ruled by the state via control over major towns, infra-
structure, and trade.7 All three types of frontiers “share the essential quality of being geo-
graphical regions with peculiar political, economic, social and cultural characteristics
which are not found in the core areas of state control.”8 The idea of conquest and subjuga-
tion, and of “nationalizing space” still form the core of the concept along with the belief
that these frontier regions are underused, underpopulated, and under-civilized.9
The value of the frontier notion is that it grounds and defines abstract processes in con-
crete actions, effects, spaces, and places.10 Another value of the frontier notion is that it
underlines important continuities between earlier and present forms of natural resource
extraction and agricultural expansion in so-called peripheral regions around the world.
However, there is a risk of applying the concept in an overly narrow sense, thereby only
addressing issues regarding the delineation, control, and ownership of land in unclaimed
or under-cultivated areas of, for instance, the Amazon region in Latin America,11 sub-
Saharan Africa,12 or Southeast Asia.13
A more serious problem is that the notion of frontiers tends to obscure the fact that there
are important qualitative metamorphoses in contemporary frontiers that result from upscal-
ing in terms of size, speed, and intensity. A good example is the large-scale appropriation of
land that is already being intensively used to satisfy local needs by local and sometimes inter-
national companies. Generally, these firms, in Indonesia for example, have no intention of
stimulating civilization, institutionalization, law and order, or political control. Their only
goal is to transform these areas into plantations or large-scale production areas for export
crops, and only for as long as these areas are productive. Even ownership of the land is
often not a goal, just making a profit. Although land deals are not new, the direct acquisition
of land for economic purposes on this scale and in this way were unanticipated at the time of
past state acquisitions, not even during the heydays of nineteenth-century colonialism.14
2Turner 1963; Billington 1971.
3Turner 1963.
4Geiger 2009.
5Geiger 2009.
6Friedmann 1996, 2; Geiger 2009, 33.
7Geiger 2009, 34.
8Kopytoff 1987; Gaubatz 1996; Geiger 2009, 35.
9See Geiger (2009) for a more elaborate account on the conceptualization of the frontier notion and a more extensive expli-
cation of the extraction and control perspectives.
10A good example of this use of the frontier notion is found an article by McCarthy, Gillespie, and Zen (2011) on the nega-
tive impacts of palm oil extraction for beauty products on the rights of indigenous people and smallholders in Indonesia.
11See, for example, Hoefle 2006; Jepson 2006.
12See, for example, Kopytoff 1987; Le Meur 2006; Bach 2013.
13See, for example, Tsing 2005; Barney 2009.
14See Kelly and Peluso 2015, 473.
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Such large-scale land acquisitions are now taking place in countries as varied as Brazil,
Ethiopia, and Indonesia. They are arranged through complex deals, require the existence
of sophisticated, often international, law, and as a result, are often realized with the help of
international, national, and local brokers, firms and lawyers; and, when and wherever
needed, some extra less lawful pushing or placating. Lorenzo Cotula goes as far as to
argue that this new global land rush has created a new turning point in relationships
between North and South.15
The same reasoning holds for new complex environmental schemes, such as REDD+,
that generate new and hybrid forms of cooperation between local, national, and inter-
national players, and require new perspectives on the interaction between nature,
economy, and climate and, as a result, a new perspective on law, business, and invest-
ments. The objective behind REDD+ is to reduce emissions that lead to climate change
by protecting or restoring nature with carbon-storage capacity in Southern countries,
such as Indonesia.
In the same vein, Lorenzo Cotula has noted that the contemporary run for biofuels in
Western countries has forged new constellations of energy, agribusiness, and biotech com-
panies that have brought about new crops (e.g. jatropha) and have found new uses for
crops such as rapeseed, sugar cane, and palm oil.16
Some authors propose frontier concepts that include many of the above-mentioned
phenomena.17 In reality, the contemporary notion of frontiers also links to a broad
range of related debates, such as discussions on land grabbing and land reform, national
sovereignty, geopolitics, financial investments, food security, climate change, property
rights, biodiversity, new forms of interaction with nature, national identity and border-
lands, and the limits of democracy.18
However, crucial aspects remain underexposed or underdeveloped, aspects
that would benefit from upholding the notion that we are again witnessing a hybrid
contemporary empirical reality in frontier regions. We highlight this by drawing
on Indonesia, and specifically Kalimantan, to elucidate the shifting of borders into
areas that are as yet unknown. To do so, we draw on our fieldwork in the
region between 2002 and 2015, predominantly in the provinces of East and West
Kalimantan.
Borders that once were clear and solid between physical areas, local and supra-local
actors, distinct notions of time and space, or opposing notions such as nature and
culture, have become hybrid. This is to say, existing boundaries have been renewed
while new boundaries have been drawn, and what these boundaries are has been redefined
such that the boundaries between concepts and objects that were once solid and distinct
have been fading away, or at least transformed. The newness in our idea of frontiers is that
it questions existing frontiers, both physical and non-physical, and points the way toward
new types of delineation. In the remainder of this paper, we therefore broaden the focus
further by drawing upon the perspectives of hybridity and interstitial space, while building
15Cotula 2012, 672.
16Cotula 2012, 673.
17De Konink 2006; Little 2001; Tsing 2005, 2008; Li 2014.
18See, for example, Hoefle 2006; Fox and Swamy 2008; Elden 2010; Ishikawa 2010; Nooteboom and de Jong 2010; White
and Dasgupta 2010; Anseeuw, Ducastel, and Gabas 2011; Eilenberg 2011; Fassin 2011; McCarthy, Gillespie, and Zen 2011;
Peluso and Lund 2011; Cotula 2012; Verbrugge 2015.
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upon the most recent frontier studies that put forward the idea that we should move
beyond the nature–culture divide.
Indonesian frontierization processes
There have been two major stimuli of frontiers in Southeast Asia.19 The first was the
growing worldwide demand for bulk tropical agricultural products such as rice, rubber,
and hardwoods beginning in the 1850s.20 This triggered rapid land reclamation in the
region. The second, from the 1950s onwards, was caused by growing demands for food
and natural resources spurred by rapid population growth and the introduction of new
crops and technologies. In this second phase, the frontier primarily pushed up into the
highlands.21
While plantations and estates played a major role in the colonization of frontiers, small-
holders were the driving force behind agricultural expansion. Often, such people set out
for these frontiers on their own initiative, or were indirectly stimulated by the state
through the building of infrastructure, and sometimes even directly, as in Indonesia, by
state-subsidized resettlement schemes.
We have identified eight specific drivers behind the rapid expansion of frontier areas in
Indonesia: (1) a strongly growing demand for fossil fuels and new fossil fuel extraction
areas from the 1970s onwards; (2) the call for democratization and decentralization,
after the fall of President Suharto, resulting in empowerment of local governments and
erosion of national authority; (3) the proliferation of new laws and regulations; (4) a rock-
eting demand for new energy resources, such as biofuels, since the turn of the century; (5)
a growing demand from BRIC countries, primarily China, for all kinds of natural
resources and food; (6) a search by governments, since roughly 2010, for natural locations
to store carbon to mitigate the effects of climate change, combined with new international
financial arrangements; (7) widespread financial deregulations since the 1990s
accompanied by the worldwide circulation of huge amounts of cheap money, which has
increased investments in the resource exploitation areas; and (8) the introduction of
new private property regimes grounded in international law that replace or run parallel
to cultural, regional, and national laws and lead to a growing monetization of food pro-
duction and conservation.
These new drivers have resulted in new arrangements that address some aspects of tra-
ditional perspectives on frontiers while introducing others.
An increasing role for international actors, private companies, and NGOs
In Indonesia, multinational corporations established themselves in Kalimantan, Papua,
Sulawesi, Sumatra, and elsewhere to exploit natural resources beginning in the 1970s.22
The underlying objective was state-led development controlled by a centralized state
apparatus that depended heavily on military power to control outer frontier regions. In
19Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011.
20See, for instance, Ingram 1971.
21Hall, Hirsch, and Li 2011, 29.
22Volkman 1985, 135.
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the early 1990s, privatization was embraced although the main beneficiaries remained
much the same: the President’s family and his close cronies. As a result, foreign invest-
ments in the natural resource-rich regions of the archipelago were even more strongly
stimulated, leading to the opening up of many new frontiers. State policy privileged cor-
porate control over natural resources, with huge tracts of land assigned to logging, mining,
pulp, and paper companies.23
At the same time, a counter movement emerged worldwide, with the aim of protecting
nature from further degradation. Alarming signs that natural resources, species, and land-
scapes were dwindling fast, especially in tropical regions, triggered this movement. The
goal was to protect at least some areas and endangered species against commercial inter-
ventions by creating nature reserves. However, this conservation movement led to ambi-
guity over ownership, access, use, and allocation of areas turned into reserves.24 In
Kalimantan, this struggle peaked in 2005 with the presentation of the “Heart of
Borneo” conservation vision and action to protect an area of 220,000 square kilometers.25
This initiative involved UN agencies, ASEAN, government agencies from Brunei, the
Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and Indonesia, as well as NGOs such as Nature
Conservancy, the Wildlife Conservation Society, Conservation International, and World
Wildlife Foundation, and corporate funders such as the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank Cor-
poration.26 The proposed area covered parts of the Indonesian province of Kalimantan,
Brunei Darussalam, and the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and Sabah. Indonesia gave
its official support for the project in 2006, leading to considerable local unrest. This
recalls the traditional frontier neglect of the rights and voices of indigenous people. Yet,
this also illustrates a characteristic of new frontiers: a cross-border nature reserve involving
three countries, and an actor network that included an array of national and supra-
national players, public and private as well as non-profit and for-profit organizations.
“Good governance” and radical institutional reformation
In 1998, President Suharto’s authoritarian and highly centralized regime was overthrown.
Democratization and decentralization became the new paradigm. Regional governments
were granted substantial autonomy and local governance was strengthened. These
radical institutional reforms were inspired by notions of good governance as developed
in the West. However, these expectations were not met in Indonesia with respect to
natural resource policy. In some instances, developments were clearly in the opposite
direction. In many places, the exploitation of natural resources intensified: huge tracts
of forestland were designated for logging, mining, and oil palm plantations. A new law
on regional government (No. 22/1999), which authorized districts and municipalities to
manage their affairs pursuant to their needs, goals, and capacities incited regional
euphoria, but also generated fragmentation and greed.27 Local governments initiated all
kinds of rent-seeking activities, an attitude that was encouraged by an attitude that was
encouraged by this new law, which mandated up to eighty percent of revenues from
23Tsing 2008, 138.
24Tsing 2008, 155–156.
25Persoon 2007, 27.
26Dewi 2013.
27Patlis 2008, 419.
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natural resource industries were to be directed to the regional governments. Previously,
the figure was twenty percent. Communities residing in or near forest areas were per-
mitted to collectively exploit and even log forests.28 Moreover, governors were allowed
to grant concessions of up to 10,000 ha and district heads of 100 ha to private compa-
nies.29 The result was a logging boom in Indonesia that, although small scale in each
location, resulted in the fastest and most widespread deforestation Indonesia had ever wit-
nessed. Frontiers opened up everywhere.30
Ambiguous laws, power, and institutions
This period can be seen as a phase in which “the frontier began to spin out of control even
from the perspective of capitalist investors and migrant entrepreneurs.”31 The depth and
scale of these processes were new in the sense that frontiers started to (re)emerge in
regions that had long since been politically integrated into the Indonesian state, such as
various coastal regions of East, West, and Central Kalimantan.32
It is clear that decentralization does not necessarily result in democratization, good
governance, or the strengthening of civil society at the regional level. In the case of
post-Suharto Indonesia, “we often witness a decentralization of corruption, collusion
and political violence that once belonged to the centralized regime of the New Order,
and is now molded into the existing patrimonial patterns at the regional level.”33
Elected leaders had to pay back businesses and rich individuals who financed their
nomination process to become governors or district heads.34 All these changes, taking
place toward the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, generated new impacts in
frontier regions, in the sense of being caused by unfamiliar drivers and resulting in
unexpected political consequences. They were not new in the sense of promulgating cor-
ruption, since this was rampant in the past, but they were surely new in the way that
central power became corroded along with its main institutional pillars, such as the
police, district heads, and governors, without the prospect of new forms of accountable
local governance.
The more flexible regulation of foreign investments, combined with the rapidly growing
demand for resources such as gold, coal, and biofuels since the late 1990s, provided a strong
impetus to the opening up of new resource frontiers in the outer islands of the archipelago. It
became a golden age for the mining sector in Indonesia. However, as with forestry regulation,
the decentralization measures created significant confusion over whether national or local
authorities were supposed to grant and supervise mining rights in a particular region.35 Insti-
tutional ambiguity led to overlapping claims among the central, regional, and local govern-
ments. This process of simultaneous overlapping and competing claims, laws, and actors,
ranging from the indigenous to the national and sometimes supra-national levels, is
indeed a major difference between traditional and new frontiers.
28Obidzinski and Kusters 2015.
29Casson and Obidzinski 2002; Tacconi et al. 2004.
30Casson 2001; Khan 2001; McCarthy 2002; Smith et al. 2003.
31Tsing 2008, 156.
32See, for example, Bakker 2009.
33Schulte Nordholt and Klinken 2007, 19. See also Aspinall and Klinken 2011 regarding the State and illegality in Indonesia.
34Aspinall 2013.
35Spiegel 2011.
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In addition, this ambiguity created new opportunities for plantation companies and
investors. For example, in the district of Kutai Kartanegara (East Kalimantan), a large
plot of land was sold to a palm oil company by Bugis migrants, who had occupied the
land since the 1980s. Originally, the land had belonged to the Kutai Kingdom but the
central government had claimed it as state forest in the 1970s. The Kutai Sultan, who
still claimed this land, asked Dayaks for help on the basis that it was still their hunting
ground. This led to a violent conflict involving the Kutai Kingdom, state authorities,
Dayaks, and Bugis.
A transnational turn in agricultural production
As Lorenzo Cotula notes: “the borderline between food and fuel is blurred, as the same
crop may be used for both or the same plantation may involve multiple crops, and as
investment plans may evolve over project duration to respond to changing international
prices and other incentives.”36 This is especially true in the palm oil industry. Oil palm
plantations and a palm oil industry were already present in Indonesia as far back as the
early twentieth century. However, it is only recently that palm oil has become a key indus-
try in Indonesia.37 The industry has also become deeply embedded in a long international
supply and demand chain, resulting in rapid expansion and deep transformations.38
Indonesia is currently the world’s largest producer of palm oil, with exports worth USD
18.6 billion in 2015.39 Between 2000 and 2016, the area dedicated to oil palm plantations
grew from four million to eight million hectares, and the government has set a production
target of forty million tons of crude palm oil by 2020.40 Permits have already been granted
for a further 26.7 million hectares of oil palm plantations, an area roughly the size of main-
land Italy.
Malaysian, Singaporean, and U.S. investors are involved in over sixty percent of the
Indonesian palm oil industry.41 According to 2009 estimates, more than fifty Malaysian
companies controlled a significant share of the sector, with an especially strong concen-
tration on Kalimantan. These companies entered Indonesia either indirectly through
the acquisition of Indonesian plantation companies or, more recently, directly by acquir-
ing concessions from local or regional governments. By 2013, the industry was dominated
by more than thirty big groups.42 Singapore also plays a significant role by providing funds
for the expansion of the oil palm industry in Indonesia through various international
banks.43 Several plantation-based companies have turned to Singapore to raise capital
through public offerings and listings on the Singapore stock exchange.
Investment in oil palm expansion is subject to national laws and regulations. The
release of forestland for oil palm use requires a review by and the explicit approval of
the National Ministry of Environment and Forestry. However, where national stipulations
have limited further expansion, local governments have facilitated the expansion of oil
36Cotula 2012, 663.
37Jiwan 2013, 51.
38Pye 2013a, 7.
39See http://www.indonesia-investments.com/nl/business/grondstoffen/palm-olie/item166.
40Krisnamurti 2009.
41Jiwan 2013, 52.
42Jiwan 2013.
43Hai 2013, 33.
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palm plantations by issuing their own permits based on older national or recent regional
legislation. In Kalimantan, for example, local governments have issued oil palm conces-
sions for millions of hectares of forest and allowed many companies to proceed with
land clearing. Although the price for raw palm oil is officially set in Jakarta, in practice,
the actual price is negotiated at the provincial and district levels between companies
and officials. During our fieldwork in 2015, a sixty-year-old palm oil smallholder in
Sanggau, West Kalimantan, explained the process:
The palm oil company has a monopoly on the processing of oil palm as it is the only one in
the region. The company delivers pesticides and fertilizer and decides when we should
harvest. We need to use fertilizer and pesticides otherwise the trees become only half the
size which also has consequences for the size of the fruits that bear oil palm. The price for
the raw oil palm is set by the company in consultation with the officials in the district
office every month. When the price of raw oil palm is high, the price that we need to pay
for the fertilizer and pesticide will increase, so the company is still making the same
amount of money.
New environmental governance regimes
When the Indonesian Government announced, in May, 2005 plans to develop 1.8 million
hectares of oil palm lands along the Indonesia–Malaysia border in Kalimantan, the
Chinese government and various companies started to show an interest in producing
palm oil in Indonesia. This “Kalimantan Border Oil Palm Mega Project” includes parts
of three national parks and, as such, is clearly incompatible with the “Heart of Borneo”
rainforest protection project. As Oetami Dewi commented, “The ensuing controversy
around both projects represents the dichotomy between ‘development’ and ‘conservation’
in its purest form.”44 The Indonesian government, and particularly the Ministry of Agri-
culture, wants to expand palm oil production to attract foreign investment, raise export
revenue, and improve the living conditions of people in the area. Conversely, the Heart
of Borneo consortium wants to protect the remaining rainforest in order to safeguard bio-
diversity, genetic resources, and the hydrology of the island, and to enable carbon storage.
In 2011, Indonesia announced a two-year moratorium on new business concessions in
primary forest and peat land to reduce its greenhouse emissions. This moratorium has
been extended twice so far. In April 2016, an additional moratorium on new oil palm con-
cessions was announced, although still without an implementation date.45
New environmental governance regimes also include the REDD+ scheme, which is
meant to facilitate the mobilization of massive financial resources for reducing the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases from land-use changes in the tropical forests and wetlands of
Indonesia. The Norwegian government, one of Indonesia’s largest donors, agreed to
provide USD one billion, provided certain conditions were met, from 2011 onwards in
Indonesia and Brazil to purchase new concessions for converting forests and peat lands
into full-scale provincial-level REDD+ pilot projects. These promised REDD+ revenues
led to considerable practical issues regarding implementation as well as competition
over the expected financial benefits.46 Furthermore, they exacerbated existing conflicts
44Dewi 2013, 165.
45See, for example, Munthe 2016.
46So far, only USD$ fifty million of the results-based Norwegian funding for the Central Kalimantan-based program has
been handed over, Jakarta Globe, April 24, 2016. See also Bakker and Fristikawati 2014.
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between stakeholders over land rights and their sources (custom versus state), procedural
and equity issues related to the distribution of compensation, moral and cultural struggles
related to the question of whether ecosystem services should be commoditized, and the
local interpretation of REDD+ by various actors.47
Obfuscation of the local and the national, state and non-state actors
The voices and wishes of members of local communities are missing in the plans of
developers and conservationists, a recurring pattern in frontier areas. There is a ten-
dency to forget that the areas to be developed or protected are not empty, and to
turn a blind eye toward incompatible worldviews in human–nature relationships.
Yet, it is now widely recognized that the clearing of so-called empty lands for oil
palm plantations, in Indonesia and elsewhere, leads to much unrest and tension,48
and that indigenous people living in and from these forests often combine complex
agro-forestry systems with spiritual animist relationships with specific forests or
parts of the landscape.49 Another recurring pattern in frontier areas is that large-
scale land-clearing processes go hand in hand with a large-scale influx of migrants.50
In the oil palm plantations on Kalimantan, these migrants mostly are from Java and
Madura. The emergence of resistance by indigenous people and other local commu-
nities against these new arrivals since 1998 is another recurring pattern in Indonesian
frontier regions.
A new feature is that such resistance by indigenous and local groups is nowadays
backed by family members living in Jakarta or in regional capitals such as Surabaya,
Medan, Makassar, and Balikpapan. Also new is that outside financers and firms increas-
ingly outsource or subcontract parts of their operations to local strongmen in order to
“smoothen” their operations and avoid the risks and hassle involved in running a business
under unpredictable conditions.51 These local strongmen or “bosses” facilitate land acqui-
sition, finesse regulatory issues, and emasculate the opposition.
Such non-state power holders have become increasingly influential and also regularly
take the side of the population against developers and companies. Alongside the national
and regional governments, the police and the military, local vigilante mass organizations
(organisasi kemasyarakatan or ormas) have become key players by regulating access to
and control over natural resources in many of the resource-rich regions of Indonesia.52
These organizations set themselves up as brokers and enforcers, represent specific interests
such as the local population or investors, and are capable and willing to use violence. They
position themselves as NGOs, and refer to national laws as well as to public support to
legitimize their activities, albeit with the threat to use violence as extra leverage, if necess-
ary. This is illustrated by one of our interviewees during a short fieldwork trip in East Kali-
mantan in 2014:
47Medrilzam and Herbohn 2011.
48The NGO Sawit Watch documented over 500 ongoing conflicts in the palm oil sector in 2008 (Pye 2013b, 183).
49Pye 2013b, 182.
50Rudel and Roper 1997.
51See also Aspinall and Klinken 2011; McCarthy 2007.
52Bakker 2015.
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ADayak man who arrived from the hinterland to the city of Samarinda in East Kalimantan in
2007 joined an ormas as he could not find any other way to make an income. This ormas was
fighting with a mining company over land just to the north of the city. The ormasmanaged to
mobilize about 10,000 people who were protesting against the company and claiming land
that was still under concession but no longer used by the company. After the company offi-
cially transferred the land to the local government, the ormas claimed the land and sold it to
the local population for about rupiah 100,000–150,000 per verkaveling (10 × 12 meters). In
2014, when the government was planning to build a highway on the land, its status was
still unclear and hundreds of people had already built houses on the small plots and
planted fruit and rubber trees.
The interviewee, who is living there with his Torajan wife and two children, is not plan-
ning to leave. He claimed that the land had been owned by his Dayak ancestors and, there-
fore, he still has the right to use it.
Arrival of new (international) actors and coalitions of actors
The processes outlined above have intensified and spread natural resource exploitation in
Indonesia and have paved the way for forms of frontierism that, in more than one respect,
can be called new. Some of the major players in contemporary advanced capitalism, for
example, giant multinationals such as Unilever, large NGOs such as WWF, banks, and
hedge funds including Merricks and new powerful economies like China, have become
active in the resource frontiers of Indonesia, creating new-style frontiers given the
nature of the actors involved and the magnitude and diversity of the stakes. These
stakes touch upon many issues related to production, consumption, and investment,
but also raise questions concerning climate change, biodiversity, equity, and distributive
justice. At stake are the economic, ecological, social, cultural, and political benefits and
costs of resource mining and of large-scale land reclamation and acquisition in peripheral
regions. The new frontiers are testing grounds for new ideas, such as whether nature off-
setting53 is an acceptable and appropriate strategy for protecting biodiversity in nature-
rich areas or whether large-scale financial investment in land and nature in peripheral
regions constitutes a resilient and sustainable way to diversify investment portfolios,
prevent future financial meltdowns, and hedge against inflation.54 Another idea being
investigated is to use forest-rich frontier regions such as Kalimantan for large-scale
carbon storage, for instance, through the restoration or protection of peat or forest, to
mitigate climate change.55
A novel aspect of all these developments is the power and composition of the networks
of involved actors, and the nature, scale, and inter-connectedness of their interactions.
Here again, it is not so much the presence of these actors, or the nature of the key
actors, such as national, regional, and local governments, firms, migrants, indigenous
people, and local communities, which is new. The newness is to be found in their
inter-connection, the characteristics and hybridity of their networks, and the scale of
their interactions. Moreover, there is a growing involvement of new actors such as
China and India, both directly and indirectly, through brokers or the market. These
53This is the idea that you are allowed to use nature in one place if you create at least the same amount of the same type of
nature elsewhere.
54Anseeuw, Ducastel, and Gabas 2011; Chen et al. 2014.
55Adams 2010; MacDonald 2010; Sullivan 2013.
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newcomers often cooperate closely with national or local governments as well as local
business and other elites in host countries.56 Local elites also take up a new role, initiating
intensive collaborations with all kinds of international actors, including firms, financial
institutions, and governments. They use their influence in national governmental
bodies to gain control over natural resources or, conversely, use their control over
resources to grab state power or develop new forms of patronage, sometimes with
global ramifications.57
Economization and monetarization of ecological practices and discourses
The impact of introducing private property regimes, with all their accompanying
complications, was already an aspect of earlier frontiers. What is new is the rapid
introduction of large-scale private property regimes grounded in international law,
forged in the headquarters of multinationals or in the chancelleries of foreign
capitals.58
A good example is the idea that common property resources such as ground water can
be patented and, as a consequence, privatized and confiscated by firms that are not even
located in the countries in question. Formerly, much of the land in Indonesia was state-
owned, especially in frontier regions. This is a legacy of the Dutch colonial era, when
law tended to treat non-cultivated land as empty, that is, as free to exploit. Yet, as Alice
Kelly and Nancy Lee Peluso observe:
Today’s frontiers of capitalism are not remote or “newly discovered” spaces. Instead,
these frontiers are new commodity forms within the confines of already formalized
state lands. [… ] State lands become frontiers when changes in broader economy and
logics of economic development reconstitute the relationships between capital, society,
and state authorities.59
The apparently simple act of buying land or access to land leads to far-reaching social,
cultural, political, ecological, and economic implications and complications. It initiates a
sequence of simultaneous and interrelated changes in many domains, from the introduc-
tion of new definitions of use rights and property, territory and the delineation of that ter-
ritory, community and collective action, human–human interaction and social structures,
and human–nature interactions, to new rules for political interaction with the state, a new
division of labor, and the introduction of the economy as a separate and dominant
domain.60
Broadening the focus
The newness in our idea of frontiers is that it questions existing frontiers, both physical
and non-physical, and points the way toward new types of delineation. In what follows,
we broaden the focus by drawing on three perspectives: (1) hybridity as the new frontier;
(2) interstitial space – the space in-between; and (3) beyond the nature–culture divide.
56Cotula 2012.
57Cotula 2012.
58See also Kelly and Peluso 2015.
59Kelly and Peluso 2015, 475.
60Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014.
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Hybridity as the new frontier
The original frontier perspective was about rolling out civilization and modern govern-
mental control over blank spaces on the map, an uncivilized empty wilderness. Within
this perspective, there is a strong divide between civilized and uncivilized, utility and use-
lessness, efficiency and inefficiency, and law and lawlessness. There is a clear boundary (or
frontier) and the goal is to move the boundary toward efficient usage, civilization, utility,
law, and state control. The regions that border this boundary form a twilight zone where
everything is less clear-cut. However, the lack of clarity in frontier regions is stronger, as it
is in these supposedly wild regions that the boundary with civilization, and everything that
comes along with this, is threatened.
Bruno Latour used the idea of hybridization to show that modernity’s attempt to create
clarity by drawing sharp boundaries culminates in the emergence of even more twilight
zones, different shades of gray, or hybrids.61 Latour regards the “proliferation of
hybrids” – of quasi-objects and the multiplication of intermediaries between humans
and nonhumans – as emblematic of the modern world.62 The irony of modernity, he
notes, is that we are so often seeking to continuously advance and reify the definitions
and categories of the objects and concepts around us that, in seeking to increasingly
become modern, we are in fact moving further and further away from a cohesive under-
standing of the world.
The idea of new frontiers takes account of this hybridization and its consequences by
considering the consequences on actors, acts, motivations, practices, rules, institutions,
spaces, and time, including the effects of scale. That is, the boundaries between, for
example, actors or between the local and the supra-local have become fluid and
complex, and difficult to unambiguously interpret.
New frontiers as an interstitial space
The notion of interstitial space – literally the space in-between, that which is located
between the two spaces and yet not to be conceptualized – is closely related to hybridiz-
ation. It denotes the gap between two given spaces, while the concept of hybridization
challenges the existence of two apparently given and sharply demarcated and distin-
guished spaces. From the perspective of an interstitial space, there would be two spaces
(physical or otherwise) that are not completely and seamlessly woven through a clearly
defined border, such as in the example about the gray zone where smuggling occurs.63
From a hybridity perspective, the concept of interstitial space can be used to show that
everything has become fluid.64 This requires rethinking what these spaces actually are,
what the practices are that take place in these spaces, and who the actors are in these
spaces that negotiate their boundaries.
The interstitial spaces in the Kalimantan frontiers are not just mapped and shaped by
the state, business, and civil society. Other actors include local elites, vigilantes, indigenous
61Latour 1993.
62Latour 1993, 131–133.
63This relates to Bhabha’s idea of hybridity which he linked to people living in a post-colonial contra-modernity reality
which captures “the hybrid and syncretic perspectives [… ] of those half-inside and half-outside of modernity, a con-
scious mixing of traditions and crossing of boundaries.” See Bhabha 1994.
64Latour 1993, 2004.
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leaders and other power-brokers, the military and the police, local communities, immi-
grants, and investors. The larger networks referred to above include fluid clusters of busi-
nessmen, politicians, officials, and local people co-opted by firms or the government. For
example, one actor can provide licenses to palm oil companies in his role as a government
official and, at the same time, protest against the arrival of new plantations with his own
community members.
This interstitial process, with its scale, complexity, and fluidity, is crucial in understand-
ing what happens in frontier spaces. It requires the identification of actors and their
agency if one is to develop a perspective that views new frontiers as spaces of action
that are not confined to the geographical locations where the impact is realized. It is in
this space in-between that people and organizations meet, interact, generate meaning
and purposes, and define resources. These actor networks are shifting, tangled, and
dynamic, connecting rural to rural, rural to urban, and nature with culture and
economy, although not always to the same intensity.65 Contemporary interstitial frontier
spaces are areas where natural resources, boundaries, and identities are reshaped, thereby
questioning established categorizations of culture and identity.66
This cultural, social, and political hybridity and fluidity easily generate conflicts and
violence, the more so because there are no clear rules for conflict resolution or mitigation.
The state is but one of many competing actors.67 It is not so much that legal, political, and
historical state institutions are absent. It is more that existing rules and institutions are in
flux and contested. This is especially crucial in the new Indonesian frontiers of
Kalimantan.
Beyond the nature–culture divide
Most approaches to studying resource exploitation still use a strictly physical and func-
tional definition of what natural resources are, and hence, the particular types of capacities
and use.68 Nature is seen as a pre-given entity or a system or composite of systems, which
is supposed to provide services to humankind.
However, there is a large body of work showing that nature and natural resources
perform roles that go beyond delivering services, and certainly beyond only material ser-
vices.69 These accounts emphasize “the interrelation between the production of resources
as valuable objects and the production of human subjectivities and, indeed, entire
cosmologies.”70
The discussion needs to move beyond the functional approach, that is, the question of
what services nature can offer to us or what services we can offer to nature.71 Nature is not
given. Nor are the ways we interact with nature or the ways we perceive and value that
interaction and ourselves in that interaction.72 It is often in frontier areas that the artificial
65Bhabha 1994; Sofield 2006; Naum 2010.
66Meredith 1998; Sofield 2006.
67Peltier 2009.
68Baviskar 2008; Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014.
69See, for example, Braun and Castree 1999; Bridge 2001, 2009; Ferry and Limbert 2008; Gilberthorpe 2007; Richardson and
Weszkalnys 2014; Tinker Salas 2009; Tsing 2005; Jong et al. 2015; Knippenberg 2015.
70Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014, 11.
71See, for example, Braun 2002.
72Ingold 2000.
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character of the culture–nature divide becomes evident. It is in, or because of, the contem-
porary frontier areas that it becomes clear that the existing distinctions between nature
and culture no longer hold. Our societal systems are conditioned by and dependent on
natural processes, just as natural systems are conditioned and often dependent on
human interactions and other societal processes. Increasingly, researchers talk about
socio-ecological systems, to indicate that we should, at least theoretically, merge culture
and nature to develop a perspective for understanding our contemporary world. A
good illustration is the climate change debate. It is now recognized that all human civiliza-
tions have developed in a period when the climate, because of its stable temperatures, was
extremely favorable for their development. That period is often claimed to be over, largely
because of human actions and interactions. The resulting climate changes will deeply
influence the capacity to uphold and shape our societies. This insight draws new
borders, and is visible in and because of processes taking place in contemporary extraction
frontiers areas.
Thinking of resources as a social category requires us to take account of the dynamic
quality of those resources. What qualifies as a resource at a certain time and place
varies73 and depends on the existing social and culture–nature relationship, and the inter-
ests, beliefs, and practices of involved actors.
Images and ideas of nature and natural resources create reality. However, most descrip-
tions of resource frontiers still (1) see the existence and nature of resources as given, (2)
label and count them, and (3) describe them in terms of ownership.74 Anna Tsing
depicts a frontier as an edge of space and time: a zone of the not yet – not yet mapped,
not yet regulated; in fact, a zone of un-mapping with regard to the already present outlooks
and practices:
Frontiers are not just discovered at the edge; they are projects in making geographical and
temporal experience. Frontiers make wildness, entangling visions and vines and violence;
their wildness is both material and imaginative. This wildness reaches backward as well as
forward in time, bringing old forms of savagery to life in the contemporary landscape.75
Conclusion
In this article, we propose enriching and broadening the perspective on frontiers, and
especially with regard to the Indonesian situation, in four ways. First, the role of space
has changed. In traditional frontier theory, space is localized and straightforward. The
frontier demarcates the boundary between the civilized and the empty, underused, or
under-cultivated. However, in the contemporary frontier zones of Indonesian Kalimantan,
space and control have become far more hybrid. They are spaces within an existing nation
state, without clear physical or even defined boundaries, where central state control, insti-
tutions, and social networks have declined or at least become less solid.
Second, the role of time differs. Processes that took decades to unfold in the era of the
traditional frontier now come to fruition in just a few years. Moreover, time and space
have merged. Processes originating thousands of miles away, such as the desire to
73Bridge 2009, 1219–1221.
74Tsing 2005, 29.
75Tsing 2005, 28–29.
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protect biodiversity, store carbon, or reduce the amount of animal fat in processed food in
developed countries, trigger rapid and large-scale transformations in Kalimantan.
Third, the actors differ. This is strongly linked to the upscaling of space and time
described above. Growing numbers of increasingly differentiated actors as diverse as
WWF officials, CEOs of multinational firms, investors, state officials, and local commu-
nity leaders interact in ever more complicated ways in new frontier areas.
Fourth, social and socio-ecological relations differ. Contemporary frontier areas on
Kalimantan have become zones of encounters between competing social–cultural,
socio-economic, and economic–ecological practices, discourses, and traditions. They
involve people living in frontier areas as well as a growing variety of outsiders such as
bankers, financers, transnational firms and NGOs, civil servants, and sometimes even
foreign governments. These actors have different perspectives and goals that shape,
define, organize, structure, and delineate their mutual relationships, and their relation
with the frontier area.
No longer is this an issue of a clash between “civilization” and “backwardness” or
between opposing perspectives on what civilization, progress, advancement, or backward-
ness mean or should mean. New frontiers are about the limits – the frontiers – of a process
that has been ongoing since nineteenth-century colonialism. The “new” in our broadened
perspective on frontiers is about the limits to the commodification, privatization, mone-
tization, and marketization of human discourses and practices, and all human–nature
interactions (land, labor, nature, valuing).
The developments that have taken place in Indonesia, notably since the late 1990s,
make Indonesia, and especially Kalimantan, a particularly intriguing case for applying,
testing, and further constructing an enriched frontier concept. As such, this article can
be seen both as an effort to enrich the theoretical umbrella for frontier research, and as
a stepping-stone in an ongoing program to develop a framework for analyzing and under-
standing processes in these new frontiers, not only in Kalimantan but also in the rest of
Indonesia and beyond.
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